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Artels, some kind of semi-formal association for co-operative labor, were widely spread in Russia 
right up till early twentieth century. There are different explanations of this phenomenon. Using 
the New Institutional Economics approach the paper reveals that artels as an organizational form 
of production that existed mainly due to rather effective solving adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems.
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РОССИЙСКАЯ АРТЕЛЬ КАК ОРГАНИЗАЦИОННАЯ ФОРМА ПРОИЗВОДСТВА
В XIX — НАЧАЛЕ XX В.: НЕОИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ПОДХОД
Н. П. Дроздова
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9
Артельные формы организации труда и  производства существовали в  России из-
древле и применялись в самых разнообразных сферах. В данной статье выявляются при-
чины, способствовавшие относительной устойчивости и  распространенности хозяй-
ственных артелей в России. 
Важнейшими признаками артельной организации были: договорное начало; добро-
вольность вступления в артель; обязательный личный труд каждого члена в ведении про-
мысла; круговая порука, когда каждый ручался солидарно за всех остальных, а все вместе 
за каждого. Законодательство об артелях конца XVIII — начала XX в. носило самый об-
щий, рамочный, характер. В нем закреплялись принципы, спонтанно сформировавшиеся 
в процессе длительного функционирования артелей. Единственное, что постоянно под-
тверждалось в правительственных указах, касавшихся деятельности артельных органи-
заций, — это необходимость круговой поруки и ответственности членов артели друг за 
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друга. Формальные правила функционирования артелей дополнялись неформальными, 
но общераспространенными процедурами. 
С позиций новой институциональной экономической теории артельную форму 
ведения хозяйства можно трактовать как решение проблем, сопряженных с  работой
в команде. При работе в команде возникают большие трансакционные издержки: органи-
зационные, издержки мониторинга и дисциплинирования членов команды, определения 
их индивидуального вклада в общий выпуск. В трудовой артели довольно успешно были 
отработаны механизмы снижения такого рода трансакционных издержек, в том числе из-
держек формирования успешной команды, подсчета (измерения) производительности 
и вознаграждения, предотвращения возможного оппортунистического поведения. 
Мерами предотвращения предконтрактного оппортунизма служили в первую оче-
редь критерии приема в  артель: учет имущественного состояния, физических и  нрав-
ственных качеств будущего члена артели, а также наличие вступительного взноса. Важ-
ную роль играли поручительства. Критерии приема в артель обеспечивали своеобразную 
фильтрацию претендентов. Проблема подачи ложных сигналов отчасти решалась за счет 
учета места жительства, так как люди хорошо друг друга знали. Факторами, снижавшими 
вероятность постконтрактного оппортунизма, были круговая порука, принятие решений 
общим собранием, система оплаты труда и штрафных санкций, выделение специально-
го субъекта мониторинга (старосты, десятника, атамана и  т. п.). Функции принципала 
по распределению задач и контролю поочередно выполняли все члены артели. Широко 
практиковался взаимный мониторинг. 
Трудовые артели в  основном получали распространение там, где не требовалось 
больших затрат капитала, использования сложных видов техники, где труд был однород-
ным и работа могла быть разделена на качественно одинаковые части. При выполнении 
простых однородных работ практически единственным специфическим активом являет-
ся человеческий капитал работников, что усиливает возможность оппортунистического 
поведения. Для решения этой проблемы спонтанно возник соотв етствующий тип инсти-
туциональных и контрактных соглашений — артель.
Ключевые слова: артель, новая институциональная экономическая теория, производ-
ство в команде, неблагоприятный отбор, моральный риск, агентские издержки.
N. P. Drozdova
INTRODUCTION
The history of artel traces back to its origins in ninth-tenth centuries. Artels, some 
kind of semi-formal association for co-operative labor, were widely spread in Russia 
right up till early twentieth century. There was much contemporary literature of Russian 
authors dealt with different aspects of artel including its organization, typical forms, 
functioning, performance, and many others. As for publications in English directly ad-
dressed to Russian artel they are few. Socio-economic approach to artel is demonstrated 
in a profound, full of stimulating ideas, and in some way «classical» paper of Norbert 
Pinkus named «Artel» and published in 1902 in Economic Journal [Pinkus, 1902]. Pinkus 
examined origin and discussed the principles governing the formation of Russian artels. 
Among rather resent publications there are papers of Y. Imai [Imai, 1990], J. Bushnell 
[Bushnell, 1990], and A. Wood [Wood, 1990]. However the method used by the authors 
is mainly historical. Moreover Bushnell’s and Wood’s papers are devoted to very specific 
topics. Imai’s paper examines the artels and consumer cooperatives in Russia and the 
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Ukraine in the 1860s and early 1870s basing itself on the observations of contemporary 
Russian authors on this subject. 
The existence of artels was explained in different ways. Native writers stated that 
the Russian person had a specific inherent motivating commitment to collective work in 
artels. For example V. Vorontsov, a Russian populist (narodnik), specified that «our capi-
talistic manufacturing must be transformed into a state or artel production»; «our fur-
ther industrial progress will rest on truly people’s principles represented by communes 
and artels» [V. V., 1882, p. 68, 309]1. However M. Tugan-Baranovsky wrote that «despite 
all profuse talk about Russian people’s unusual propensity for working collectively, en-
thusiasm for associations and artels had no roots in Russia, and that’s why it brought no 
fruitful results. General praising of artels did not result in creating a single, stable artel 
and did not lead to the emergence of a cooperative movement somewhat similar to that 
in Europe. The individualistic West with its different political systems turned out to 
be more tailored to accept artel principles than communal Russia» [Tugan-Baranovsky, 
1997 [1907], p. 495–496; 498–499].
According to Pinkus the artel forced into existence 1) in the first instance by eco-
nomic pressure, i.e. inefficiency of individual efforts due to peculiar geographical fea-
tures of Russia (inclement and uncertain climate; vast and monotonous surface; lack of 
fertile soil; inadequate for effective intercommunication river systems; paralyzing influ-
ence of the long distances), 2) by Russia’s historical vicissitudes, in particular Mongol-
Tartar influence, and 3) by curiously complicated problems of ethnography in Russia 
[Pinkus, 1902, p. 489, 493]. Some of his arguments are undoubtedly valid but need to be 
added one which seems to be decisive in the explanation of persistence of Russian artel 
in nineteenth — early twentieth centuries. Labor artels, as an institutional form, were 
a good way of solving a classical teamwork problems and enabled to considerably cut 
agency costs.
The aim of this paper is to reveal that the existence of artels in Russia was, to a 
large extent, due to a higher economic effectiveness of this organizational form of eco-
nomic activity in some spheres. Factors which helped artels come into being and remain 
relatively stable and common in the historic past are the subject of this investigation. 
This study is based on empirical descriptions of artels of the second half of the nine-
teenth century, artels’ charters, statutes relating to artels and a wide range of historical 
literature. Alchian—Demsetz’ team production concept [Alchian, Demsetz, 1972] and 
Jensen—Merckling’s agency costs concept [Jensen, Meckling, 1976] are used as an ana-
lytical tool.
The first section of the paper describes artel as a form of economic activity in Rus-
sia, as formal and informal institution. The second one gives evidence that artel can be 
interpreted as a way of solving team production problems. The final section summarizes 
the findings and suggests some implications. 
1 See also: [V. V., 1895a; 1895b].
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ARTEL AS ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
Types of artels. Artels, some kind of semi-formal association for co-operative la-
bor, were widely spread in Russia right up till early twentieth century. There were a lot 
of artel types carrying out different work: of a spiritual character: religious, entertain-
ing, educational (joint subscriptions to newspapers and books, hire of teachers, etc.); 
nursing; communal; of thieves; of beggars; economic: agricultural, fishing, production, 
handicraft, trading, building, etc.
A special role was played by exchange (birshevaya) artels in the the nineteenth cen-
tury. Their members’ duties were diverse. One group of exchange artels provided loading 
and unloading of goods at the exchange, packed and dispatched various cargoes, guarded 
warehouses, etc. Besides that, artel members fulfilled other duties for their employers: 
they worked in offices as assistants and errand boys. Sometimes they were given big sums 
of money to carry because their employers trusted them. Quite often they did household 
chores. The members of the other group of exchange artels were employed as clerks and 
messengers in banks, commercial establishments and in the railway administration.
The main focus of this paper are artels which employed collective work. They in-
clude labor artels proper (a group of workers offering their collective services as build-
ers, diggers, loaders, porters, etc. for pay) and production artels of a pure labor type 
where all workers are owners of the plant and the goods they produce, there are no hired 
workers, the head is elected by the workers.
Artel as a formal and informal institution. The word ‘artel’ was used in legislative 
documents for the first time in the middle of the seventeen century replacing the word 
‘vataga’ (crowd). It was formalized as an institutional economic form in 1799 in Guilds’ 
Charter where in Chapter XIV «On work done by artels» artel members’ rights and du-
ties were finally defined. According to the definition formulated in Clause 1, «work or 
a task which is beyond one worker’s capabilities can be done by common consent by a 
group of workers, and such groups must be called artels» [Ustav Tsekhov, 1799]. Clause 
4 also had some important information on artels. It read that «each artel member must 
be responsible for the incurred damage or losses and guarantee payment». 
The artel definition was specified in the 1823 Statute which ran that «artel means 
that each worker is responsible for everybody in artel and the whole artel is responsible 
for each worker, they are paid from a common fund (duvan) and work is done collec-
tively» [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy poshliny…, 1823, Art. 4]. The same definitions were 
used in the Trade Charter, and in the nineteenth — early twentieth centuries artels were 
specified as «associations of workers set up voluntarily to carry out work or production 
which is beyond one worker’s capabilities» [Ustav Torgoviy, 1903, Art. 79].
Labor artel Statute was passed on June 1, 1902 in which labor artels were defined 
as «partnerships set up to carry out specific work or production as well as provide ser-
vices by participants’ personal involvement at their expense by collective guarantee». 
A similar definition was given in the Civil Statute [Svod zakonov grazhdanskih, 1906, 
Art. 21981].
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Labor artels were established in accordance with either existing statutes or agree-
ments. Their charters were submitted to the governor for approval and published in 
local newspapers. Any person, male or female, over 17 years old could become an artel 
member. But under-21s had no right to participate in management. Artel got an official 
status if it had 5 members and its charter did not stipulate a greater number of workers. 
It was managed by the general meeting. Meetings took place only if not less than half 
of the members were present. Every member had one vote. Decisions were made by a 
majority of votes. More important decisions required the presence of 2/3 of its members. 
Membership fees were the same for everybody and could be paid in cash or in kind. If 
sums paid to the cashier exceeded fees, they were considered as loans. Wages were paid 
to all members in accordance with the resolution of the general meeting regardless of 
the sums in each member’s account. Artel used its assets to cover all losses and meet li-
abilities. If artel’s assets were insufficient, its members’ private property was claimed in 
its entirety or in the amount specified in the Charter.
All chartered artels enjoyed the rights of entities, i.e. they could buy assets, sign 
agreements, sue and be sued, set up or take on lease industrial or trade facilities. 
Thus, the most important features of artels in Russia were as follows:
• voluntary membership;
• personal involvement in artel’s activities binding for all members;
• collective guarantee (krugovaya poruka), i.e. all members shared responsibility 
for the damage and losses; 
• besides that, amendments to the 1823 Guilds Charter stated that anyone wishing 
to be an artel member must pay an admittance fee. 
These formal principles of managing artel’s activities supported by the legislation 
strengthened the rules used by artels at the time and which were full of generalities. The 
only thing regularly highlighted by various state decrees on objects of management was 
the necessity of each member to carry responsibility for artel.
As far as artels’ structure, relationships among members, their contracts and agree-
ments are concerned, there was hardly any legislation on that, and artels’ charters dif-
fered significantly from each other. That’s why formal principles were supplemented 
with informal, widely spread procedures spontaneously formed over artels’ long his-
tory. These principles include taking decisions by a vote at the general meeting, electing 
management, equality in profit sharing for the same labor input. Admittance criteria 
were also similar. The following things were taken into consideration: gender; place of 
residence; age; physical strength; skills; property status; no other jobs; moral qualities 
(soberness was valued most highly).
These criteria were to provide artel members with work on equal terms in return 
for their commitment to work in artel’s interests. Honest work was also guaranteed by: 
admittance fee; references (until the admittance fee is fully paid); tests; trial period; pen-
alties; risk of expulsion from artel; collective guarantee.
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SPREAD OF ARTELS 
A lot of modern scientists insist that artels as economic forms were ubiquitous 
in Russia. In particular B. Mirinov, a historian specializing in social history, is one of 
them. In his two-volumes investigation of Russian social history he writes that «besides 
communes in rural and suburban areas, they (peasants — N. D.). developed a kindred 
organizational form, artel, which we see in every place where people are involved in 
specific activities beyond peasants’ and settlement communes» [Mironov, 2003, vol. 1, 
p. 525–526].
But a thorough study of facts makes it possible to conclude that collective labor 
forms, including artels, were not as common as they are sometimes described. First of 
all production artel’s «natural habitat» was quite narrow and was confined within a) 
activities of low capital investment, simple homogeneous job and labor with primitive 
equipment and technology; b) lower classes of population. Artel in its «pure» forms did 
not survive in other spheres. Secondly the collective forms of labor in Russia were often 
introduced deliberately and to a considerable degree were connected with the non-eco-
nomic coercion and propagation. Deliberate creation of labor artels by some enthusiasts 
required much time, effort and investments from them.
Indeed only two artel types were common and successful in Russia, i.e. butter man-
ufacturing and exchange ones. Exactly these artel types are often referred to when prov-
ing that artelnost is inherent in the Russian national character. Let’s consider each type 
in detail.
There were 51 butter manufacturing artels in Russia in 1901; in 1917 their number 
was 3,000. They were not of a labor type though, because hired workers were engaged 
in butter manufacturing. Small milk producers owned these artels, managed the manu-
facturing process personally and collaborated with other owners only when selling milk. 
Consequently, a butter manufacturing artel is a selling cooperative, a processing partner-
ship. The butter belonged not to the producers but to the milk suppliers. Profits were di-
vided in proportion to the supplied milk, not by shares [Tugan-Baranovsky, 1989 [1919], 
p. 102]. Such artels emerged in Russia in late 1860s. They were initiated by N. Veresh-
chagin, a gentleman by birth, who borrowed the idea from Switzerland and had been 
introducing it actively in Russia since 18652. The first artels didn’t live long. One of the 
reasons of their failure was that peasants were not prepared for them. They gave no cre-
dence to this economic form. Their attitude to innovations was that of opposition. That’s 
why Vereshchagin made every effort to convince them of advantages of dairying artels. 
Butter and cheese manufacturing artels started springing up again only in late 1890s and 
became common only when peasants came to understand that it was a paying business, 
and it had advantages over other forms, including capitalistic. 
As for exchange artels regulations on them were passed on June 16, 1905. They were 
quit similar to the Labor Artel Statute. In accordance with Clause 1, «exchange artels 
aim at carrying out work related to acceptance, dispatch and storage of goods as well as 
2 See [Vereshchagin, 1999 (1865); 1999 (1870); Shatilov, Vereshchagin, 1869].
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fulfilling office tasks and trading with organizations and individuals» [O pravilakh dlya 
birzhevykh arteley…, 1905]. Exchange artels could function only in accordance with 
the charter which was approved by the Exchange Committees. Thus, exchange artels’ 
activities were based on clearly defined rules, meeting of liabilities being guaranteed 
collectively by the insurance policy. At the same time they hired outside laborers, their 
members were paid by the day and by the piece and due to these features these asso-
ciations were not artels in their true sense because they did not meet all artel’s require-
ments. As a consequence exchange artels could not be considered as «artel», which was 
officially recognized by the 1823 Statute [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy poshliny…, 1823]. 
And the fact that «they are, really, artels only in names» was absolutely correctly stressed 
by Pinkus [Pinkus, 1902, p. 487]. 
As far as labor artels which used collective work are concerned, they became 
common only in the spheres of activity which didn’t require big investments, complicated 
machinery, where work was homogeneous and could be divided into equal parts and 
done by individual workers, in other words, where people simply cooperated to do a job. 
Artels were mainly formed to produce goods in the absence of expensive machinery and 
great technical expertise [Yarotsky, 1898, p. 22]. N. Kalachov described artel as part of the 
common people’s life and relationships [Kalachov 1999 (1864), p. 308]. The last aspect 
was also admitted by Pinkus [Pinkus, 1902, p. 496] who defined artel ‘as an association 
for co-operative labour formed by the lower classes of the population themselves usually 
under pressure of extreme need and therefore strongly imbued with that spirit of local 
solidarity which the conditions of life have developed in the Russian, and also ruled by 
the customs and laws of the local Mir, the Russian village community’3.
Production artels of a pure labor type were very rare everywhere. Great Britain had 
only one artel of this type in 1916, whereas Germany had none. There were about a 
hundred small production artels in France due to the support from the government 
bodies, public institutions or individuals. Only big Italian agricultural artels achieved 
success without any support. But their aim was to fight unemployment, and their 
members had more than one job. In Russia, production labor artels didn’t become 
common either. According to I. Sapozhnikov [Sapozhnikov, 1916, p. 14], there were only 
3 It is necessary to stress that artel and peasant commune as organizational forms of production were 
quite different. In Russian peasant commune property rights regimes were of different types. There were 
communal property rights in arable land, hayfields, mills, wharfs. Arable land and hayfields were subjected 
to equally repartitions according to definite criteria. Mills and wharfs were usually leased with income at 
commune’s disposal. Common property resources (the commons) included wasteland, grazing land, rivers, 
woodland. However good-quality woodland was usually parceled out. Inherited by the family members 
plots of land attached to houses in the village used for growing vegetables, fruit, and so on. There were 
also obligatory public tillage (obshchestvennye zapashki), when some communal arable land was cultivated 
collectively and the crop was stored in so-called «storage shops» (zapasnyie magaziny) as a form of insurance 
against crop failure. Egalitarian principle concerned only land distribution not income because household 
allotments were cultivated by users individually. Moreover equal repartition was not “spontaneous order” 
but an institutional answer on governmental tax policy, namely equal poll tax imposed by Peter I and 
collective responsibility to pay taxes. Collective responsibility was almost outdated by 1900. About 99 % of 
communes did not use it.
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16 artels in Moscow in 1908, 60 in 1909, and about 115 by 1916. However, none of them 
developed into a big enterprise. They were small workshops which either died or turned 
into small capitalist enterprises. Sapozhnikov thinks that shortage of working capital and 
mainly absence of organizational, technical and institutional support caused the failure 
of those artels.
As far as agricultural artels are concerned, of all types of cooperation peasants could 
form, these were the rarest. As it is written in one of the early XX century articles on 
agricultural artels, «at present we have not more than a few dozens of big agricultural 
artels in Russia which would buy or rent land collectively with a view to working jointly 
on it» [Gorovaya, 1916, p. 8–9]. This phenomenon was caused, according to Gorovaya, by 
two things. Firstly, artel members often had to give up habits and propensities acquired 
in childhood and inherited from the previous generations. They had to conform to the 
actions and desires of their fellow-workers, but neither household possession nor the 
compulsive order in the commune taught peasants to be compliant. «Sometimes they 
champion their interests passionately but at other times they submit to the decision 
made by the majority of artel members out of necessity» [Gorovaya, 1916, p. 6]. Secondly, 
differences in peasants’ property status, capacity for work and intellectual faculties 
hampered artels’ activities.
Agricultural artels’ existence, like that of butter manufacturing ones, was mainly 
due to enthusiasts’ activities. It was Nikolai Levitsky who organized the first agricultural 
artel in Russia in 1896 and who was called ‘artel’s batko’ (ideological leader) by peasants. 
On the other hand he pointed out that labor artels in general and production artels in 
particular were the most difficult types of cooperation to put into practice. «It is not an 
easy task. It requires that peasants have plenty of stamina, developed self-consciousness 
and great initiative» [Levitsky, 1916, p. 4]. He pointed out that the society rejected 
this form of production organization, that «artels were the most neglected form of 
cooperation» unlike consumer, credit or loan-saving societies which were under the 
patronage of the community, zemstvo or state.
Only one big production artel lived long in Russia and proved to be viable. It was a 
knife-producing artel in the village of Pavlovo which was set up in 1893 and supported 
by individuals, public institutions and the state. However, Pavlovo artel gave so few 
benefits to its members that hired workers did not want to join it [Tugan-Baranovsky, 
1989 [1919], p. 207].
These facts prove once again that Russian people did not have any special propensity 
for working in artels as a way to meet their needs to work communally, and that the 
main reason for joining them was of economic nature. Collective work was only a means 
which enabled people to make money in initial conditions and types of jobs.
In practice, production artels operating both abroad and in Russia were either 
ineffective or turned into capitalist enterprises, which is demonstrated quite convincingly 
in one of the articles of the late XIX century [P-r, 1897]. Many researchers pointed out 
that a lot of artels which originally were workers’ unions turned into entrepreneurs’ 
unions. Hands were hired to do work, whereas artel members managed them and 
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gained profits. Thus, the very essence of artel as a workers’ union was destroyed. In this 
connection, wage labor in artels was restricted by law. Artels’ charters had to stipulate 
terms and the procedure of employment as well as the number of hired workers. Hired 
workers were allowed to work in artels only on a temporary basis in exceptional cases. 
These regulations artificially confined evolution of artels to capitalistic concerns and 
conserved this primitive form of economic activity. 
LABOR ARTELS AS TEAM PRODUCTION
Work in artels can be considered as teamwork. A team is a group of individuals with 
common aims who divide work among themselves and carry responsibility for achieving 
certain results. Team members are interdependent because to achieve common aims they 
need the results of the work done by their fellow-workers. The team’s main difference 
from traditional formal work groups is synergy effect (i.e. total amount of work done by 
the team exceeds the sum of their individual work). Teamwork is widely used at present. 
Teams are formed when it is economically beneficial, regardless of which culture, 
collective or individualist, prevails in the society.
Using D. McIntoch-Fletcher’s team criteria artel can be classified as an intact team 
type in contrast to a cross-functional one. An intact team is usually a production unit 
or a long-standing group of workers producing a certain product or service. It can 
have a leader who is not a team member, and whose duty is to coordinate work and 
secure order. In other cases the team can have a leader from within. In some cases team 
members can play the leading role in turn. McIntoch-Fletcher [McIntoch-Fletcher, 
1996] points out that quite developed mature autonomous intact teams can operate as 
small enterprises.
There are four team types according to their aims: consultative (dealing with 
management); production (teams of production workers, miners, repairmen, etc.); 
project (research and planning groups, etc.); action (sport teams, for example). From 
this point of view, artel can be defined as a production team.
The problem of teamwork production and methods of monitoring was analyzed in a 
well-known article by A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz [Alchian, Demsetz, 1972]. Teamwork 
entails big transaction costs: organizational, of monitoring, disciplining, assessing each 
member’s contribution to the production output. «Team production will be relied upon… 
if there is a net increase in productivity available by team production, net of the metering 
cost associated with disciplining the team» [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 780].
Alchian–Demsetz’ study was a starting point for a number of articles, including 
an article by M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling [Jensen, Meckling 1976] in which they 
introduce the notion of agency costs. According to them, in most agency relationships 
the principal and the agent incur positive costs of monitoring as well as bonding costs 
in a monetary or non-monetary form. Besides, there are the principal’s residual losses as 
a result of discrepancies between the agent’s solutions and the solutions that could have 
maximized the principal’s financial standing [Jensen, Meckling, 1976, p. 308].
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In his paper ‘Teamwork and moral hazard’, B. Holmstrom [Holmstrom, 1982] 
demonstrated that the free rider problem could be solved to a great extent if ownership 
had been at least partially separated from the workers, which gives priority to capitalist 
firms over partnerships. Labor contribution rating system can help to overcome a moral 
hazard threat because it divides risks in a more favorable way. Of great importance are 
the following questions: whether the agents can come to a mutual agreement while using 
this work assessment method; what monitoring methods are used; how the output is 
divided among team members, including the subject of monitoring, in order to work out 
the most effective incentives for work [Holmstrom, 1982, p. 338–339].
The structure of principal–agent relationships in artels was quite complicated. On 
the one hand, the owner who hired artel workers to do a job, played the role of the 
principal while artel was an aggregate agent. At the same time the owner quite often 
signed agreements with individual artel members when, for example, he hired them 
himself, as it was in barge hauling artels, or if he employed them to do some household 
chores, which was common practice in exchange artels. On the other hand, artel 
itself served as the principal towards artel members, but at the same time they jointly 
controlled artel activities because important decisions were made at the general meeting.
Labor artels had quite successful mechanisms of lowering different transaction 
costs resulting from team production:
• by preventing possible opportunism;
• by measuring productivity and remuneration;
• by solving a free rider problem when one member’s shirking affects the rest of 
the team.
Opportunistic behavior in artels. Opportunistic behavior, «self-interest-seeking-
with-guile» or calculated dishonesty according to the definition given by O. E. Wil-
liamson [Williamson, 1996, p. 378], implies pursuing one’s own goals, sometimes per-
fidiously and unethically, which interfere with an institution’s interests. Postcontracting 
opportunism becomes apparent in the form of shirking, extorting and blackmailing. 
Consequently, opportunistic behavior can testify to disregard of collective interests. Dis-
cipline (labor, technological, economic, etc.) is crucial in cooperation. Was there any 
discipline in artels? Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate the actual scale of oppor-
tunistic behavior in artels.
For example, no special penal books in exchange artels preserved. To protect artel’s 
reputation after the year was over, and all payments made, artel’s financial books were 
destroyed making it impossible to see whether any member had been fined or not [Ka-
lachov, 1999 [1864], p. 322]. However, the destruction of the books in itself testifies to 
the problem of improper attitude to work. Embezzlement was the main problem in ex-
change artels’ activities. Newspapers of the early XX century were full of embezzlement 
facts, misappropriated sums amounting to 200,000 roubles, which was a huge amount 
at the time. That’s why one of the reports made at the first all-Russia convention of ex-
change artel representatives was on reinforcement of responsibility for embezzlement 
[Vserossiysky s’ezd predstaviteley…, 1912].
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Opportunistic behavior was quite common practice in artels. In his paper on ar-
tel development in Russia, G. Petrov points out that attempts to make artels common 
failed. They failed to overcome negative features inherent in other forms of coopera-
tion. Minutes of general meetings mentioned quarrels, envy and favoritism, lack of self-
consciousness and self-discipline, and poor attendance at meetings. Because of that, 
management had to either impose penalties or pay for attending meetings. Not all artel 
members worked for it. Plenty of them used artel’s raw materials for work somewhere 
else, sometimes for artel’s competitors [Petrov, 1917, p. 66–67].
In butter-manufacturing artels members spoilt milk by adding water, some other 
substances, by no keeping within technological processes. Even such an adept artel’s ad-
vocate as M. Slobozhanin stated that artels’ reality was a far cry from their ideals embod-
ied «people’s aspirations for a better financial standing, freedom, equality, democracy, 
consciousness, dignity, friendship, fraternity, etc.» [Slobozhanin, 1919, p. 14].
Researchers of XIX — early XX centuries put forward some reasons why produc-
tion artels did not succeed. They were summarized by Tugan-Baranovsky [Tugan-
Baranovsky 1989 (1919), p. 196] and were as following: lack of discipline among artel 
members; the employer’s absence and the elected leader’s weak authority with the result 
that his decisions are ignored, with workers putting their interests first; the leader se-
lected from within, as a rule, does not have enough expertise and management skills; 
workers’ technical backwardness, weak propensity for innovations and implementation 
of modern technology; workers do not tend to use new production methods; no free-
dom in selecting staff. Staff consists only of artel members. A new member represents a 
threat to the benefits which artel has due to its old members’ effort. That’s why, if artel 
is successful, introduction of new members leads to old members’ losing part of their 
benefits. 
Prevention of opportunist behavior in artels. Admittance criteria, such as a property 
status, moral qualities of a member-to-be and an admittance fee which was, as a rule, 
quite high, were preventive measures against opportunist behavior before signing a con-
tract with the worker — screening mechanisms. For example, admittance depended on 
«paying, on average, up to 1,000 silver roubles [Kalachov, 1999 (1864), p. 320, 324]. Thus, 
to become a member of Metelkin artel at St. Petersburg’s Marine Exchange, a candidate 
had to pay a fee of 900 roubles to artel in 1812, 200 roubles paid at the time of joining it 
[Kalachov, 1999 (1864), p. 350]. At that time it was a huge amount of money which could 
be earned only by a hard working person with entrepreneurial skills. The fact of having 
this sum signalled that the candidate had all the necessary qualities. 
The problem of dealing with false information about candidates was partially solved 
by finding out the truth in the neighborhood where they lived because they had to give 
information on the place of residence. References also played an important role. Thus, 
candidates were, to some extent, screened because of admittance criteria. Besides being a 
signal, the admittance fee, according to Jensen—Meckling’s terminology, played the role 
of bonding costs, as the member who was about to be expelled from artel because of his 
inadequate behavior, lost a part or the whole sum of the collateral.
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Collective guarantee was a powerful factor which undoubtedly made postcontrac-
tual opportunist behavior less probable.4 But it could not prevent it completely. That’s 
why artel members were paid accordingly: they could be punished for their demerits in 
accordance with artel rules or resolutions passed at the general meeting. The inflicted 
punishments included fines, corporal punishment, removal from work and even expul-
sion. The list of demerits and the size of fines varied in different artels. For example, in 
Metelkin artel which was mentioned above, a member had to pay a 5-rouble fine for 
being absent from work, for abusing other members, for not being as hard working as 
them, or being drunk at work. If a member had an additional job without having let 
artel know about it, he had to pay 25 roubles [Kalachov, 1999 (1864), p. 350]. One of 
artels in 1810 had a rule of imposing a big fine on a member causing trouble between 
the employer (or ‘master’ as members of artel called him) and the members [Kalachov, 
1999 (1864), p. 349]. Some artel charters ordered its members to inform on their fellow-
workers if they misbehaved. If they did not do that, they were also severely punished. 
Such practice seemed to be common because this type of mutual monitoring consider-
ably lowered costs related to it.
One of the ways of fighting shirking suggested by Alchian and Demsetz involves 
selecting of a special subject who monitors the team’s performance. However, the prob-
lem is that the subject can shirk himself. There was a controller in each artel (starosta 
(headman), desyatnik (charge-hand), ataman) who besides getting his share of pay, as a 
rule, was paid some extra money as a bonus for his work, but was fined if he misbehaved.
Thus, exchange artels were run by persons, either selected from within who did it 
in turn, or elected at the general meeting. The «manager» (starosta) was usually elected 
for a one-year period. If he coped with his duties well, he could be re-elected for a new 
term. His duties included securing artel’s money, assigning tasks to members, checking 
their completion, imposing petty fines. The elected starosta was specially remunerated 
for his work whereas the person who played this role in turn, did not get any extra pay 
for that.
Fishing and hunting artels always had a head who was paid four to seven times more 
than an ordinary member. Barge hauling artels paid equally to all members including 
the elected desyatnik for their work but he was paid a special remuneration for addi-
tional duties.
Thus, artel can be defined as a coalition of agents with a revolving leadership struc-
ture where agents participated in profit making as well as took turns in playing the role 
of the principal. Rotation of agents in the principal position with the authority delegated 
to them to control the other members’ actions resulted in exchanging reliable informa-
tion, creating the necessary prerequisites for strengthening trustworthy relationships 
among agents and developing cooperation, which in turn led to creating an «associative 
atmosphere» within the organization which prevented opportunist behavior and maxi-
4 Grameen bank set up in Bangladesh by a 2006 Noble Prize winner, Muhhamad Unus, is a good 
modern example of giving out loans, taking into account collective guarantee as a tool to solve the problem 
of adverse selection and prevent agents’ opportunism (see: [Morduch, 1999]).
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mized feasibility [Williamson, 1975, pp. 38, 44]. Personal or collective contracts with 
an employer served as an additional protection from opportunism in artels, e. g. there 
were detailed laws regulating relationships among barge haulers and ship owners. Thus, 
conflicts could be settled both unofficially and in court, shipping and arbitrary courts 
being in charge of that.
Measurement cost cuts in artels. Payment for work done by artel members was made 
in accordance with the capital or effort contributed by each of them. Profits were usu-
ally divided equally among the members, fines being deducted after that. Sometimes the 
amount of labor input, on rarer occasions the level of expertise, were taken into account 
to calculate workers’ pay. Measuring of individual input entailed transaction costs. Cut-
ting of these costs was mainly achieved by setting up artels to carry out simple one-type 
jobs. Work could be either divided into quantitatively equal parts and assigned to sepa-
rate workers, as it was done for loading and unloading, digging, mowing, forest cutting 
jobs, or it simply required joint effort, as in barge hauling. 
Another important thing was that labor, as a production factor, was relatively ho-
mogeneous because physical strength and skills were taken into account when hiring 
artel members. This team formation principle was common everywhere. According to 
A. Engelgardt, «peasants do not agree to mow collectively by forming a line». It is pos-
sible only when artel is formed by 4–5 workers with similar capabilities» [Engelgardt, 
1956 (1897), p. 290].
The discussion of agency costs issue would be incomplete without consideration 
of interrelationship between artel’s organizational structure and the decision process. 
E. Fama and M. Jensen [Fama, Jensen, 1983] put forward a question of how to divide 
among the agents such functions as: 1) decision management (decision initiation and 
implementation); 2) decision control (decision ratification and monitoring), and 3) a re-
sidual risk bearing in order to ensure economic efficiency. According to them, in a small, 
non-complex organizations it is reasonable to make one or several agents responsible for 
these functions because if the number of residual claimants is great, their participation 
in decision control entails considerable costs. Artels were for the most part small non-
complex organizations. But the above-mentioned functions were not separated here. All 
three functions were placed in the hands of the same individuals. The key reason was 
collective guarantee. All members carried risk equally being responsible for the damage 
and losses. In return all members had equal rights for residual claims and the manage-
ment and control of important decisions at general meetings. Non-separated functions 
of risk bearing and decision-making lowered the profits, but they were possibly compen-
sated by cutting metering costs and less opportunism due to collective guarantee.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Analysis reveals that existence of artels in Russia was, to a large extent, due to a 
higher economic effectiveness of this organizational form of economic activity in some 
spheres. Principal–agent and team production approaches highlight that Russian artel 
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as an economic organization can be interpreted as an effective way for solving adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. The behavior of artels’ members was rational and 
quite individualistic.
Labor artels were mainly confined within activities of low capital investment and 
uncomplicated machinery. Work was homogeneous and the job could be divided into 
quantitatively equal parts. Practically, the only asset used to carry out simple homo-
geneous work was workers’ human capital, which could lead to extra opportunistic 
behavior. That’s why artel as a contract-based institutional type came into being to 
control it. 
Production artels in Russia were not common. They did not live long. A lot of the 
nineteenth — early twentieth century researchers considered long-term cooperation of 
producers and artels completely unpractical in Russia. Even those who believed in their 
future stressed the necessity of coercing people who worked by themselves into these 
economic organizations. It was also important that the government, local self-govern-
ment bodies (zemstva), and individual sponsors should support them. The researchers 
involuntarily pointed out that they were of contradictory character. So one shouldn’t 
exaggerate the role of artel in the process of Russian development. 
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